A law firm trust account holds other people's money, and it moves on instructions: from a client, from opposing counsel, from the terms of a settlement. Fraudsters understand that. They don't need to break into the bank. They need the firm to send money out before anyone notices that the money coming in, or the account it is going to, isn't what it appears to be.
This post covers the two schemes bar regulators warn about most, what several state ethics opinions say firms are expected to do, and five checks any firm can put in place this week.
Two schemes, one target
The counterfeit settlement. A prospective client, often in another state or country, gets in touch by email about a simple matter: a debt to collect, a dispute to settle. The other side agrees to pay almost immediately, and a convincing cashier's or certified check arrives. The client then presses the firm to wire the proceeds, less fees, right away. Days later the check comes back as counterfeit, and the money that went out came from other clients' funds in the trust account. The State Bar of California describes the pattern plainly: "The scam typically starts with a retainer agreement followed by a cashier's check for a supposed settlement."5
The story changes; the shape doesn't. In July 2025, the Florida Bar News reported on an attorney approached by a man claiming a dog bite injury and an unpaid private settlement. When the attorney contacted the named defendant, that person knew nothing about any incident, and the $215,000 check that later arrived was flagged by the bank as drawn on a closed account.7
The changed instructions. The second scheme runs the other way. Someone gains access to an email thread, or imitates one, and sends "updated" wiring instructions that appear to come from the client, the firm, or the other side. California's bar notes that scammers "gain access to emailed wiring instructions and replace them with fraudulent wire instructions," and that banks often deny liability afterward.5 This is the same pattern behind most business email compromise, and it works on settlement payouts just as well as on vendor invoices.
What the numbers show
The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center received 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 2025, with about $3.05 billion in reported losses.1 The FBI does not break that figure out for law firms, and reported losses are only the cases someone filed. The point for a firm is not the size of the total. It is that these schemes rely on ordinary-looking messages, and trust accounts are a place where an ordinary-looking message can move a large amount of money.
What bar regulators have said
Rules differ by state, and nothing here is legal advice. Still, the published ethics opinions point in a consistent direction.
- The North Carolina State Bar found that a lawyer who warned the client about wire fraud in an opening letter, and told the client to call the office to confirm instructions, had acted reasonably even though the client was later deceived by a spoofed email. A lawyer who gave no warning and made no effort to educate himself or his staff had not. A generic warning at the bottom of emails counts only if the client is specifically directed to read it.2
- An earlier North Carolina opinion found that a lawyer who took reasonable care is not ethically obligated to replace funds stolen from the trust account, but may be if a failure to use reasonable care, including in supervising staff, was a proximate cause of the theft.3
- The Alaska Bar Association, addressing the counterfeit settlement scheme directly in 2025, said a lawyer "should not disburse trust account funds without taking all reasonable steps to assure" that the funds are actually in the account and are correctly disbursed. It also quoted the expectation that firms be alert for red flags and "appropriately train their staff."4
The common thread is not a specific technology. It is a firm that knows the schemes, warns clients, verifies before money moves, and makes sure the people who handle the account know what to look for.
1. Confirm the client is real before the matter starts
A new client who communicates only by email or text, from far away, with an unusually easy matter is the opening move of the counterfeit settlement. Illinois's attorney regulator put it simply: "Know with whom you are dealing before accepting the representation," and independently verify the client's name, address, and phone number.6 Make that a step in intake, not a judgment call.
2. Wait for funds to clear, not just to appear
A deposit showing in the account is not the same as a deposit that has cleared. The Illinois alert advises waiting for a check, "even a cashier's or certified check," to clear before using the money, and confirming the check with the issuing bank.6 Use a phone number for that bank that you look up yourself, not one printed on the check or in the email. When a client pushes hard to release funds before they clear, treat the pressure itself as a warning sign.4
3. Tell clients how payment instructions will arrive, and point them to it
At engagement, put it in writing: how the firm will send wiring instructions, that those instructions will not change by email, and that the client should call the office at a known number before sending any money. Then direct the client to that notice rather than relying on a line in your email signature. That is the approach the North Carolina opinion described as reasonable.2
4. Verify any new or changed instructions by phone
This applies in both directions: instructions the firm receives for a payout, and instructions a client or opposing counsel says they received from the firm. Call a number already on file, never one from the message. California's bar suggests confirming new wiring instructions through an existing client contact, ideally in person or by video.5 Our payment-change verification policy lays out a callback rule and two-person approval you can adapt to disbursements in a day.
5. Make sure everyone who touches the trust account knows the red flags
The bookkeeper, the paralegal who prepares disbursement requests, and the assistant who answers the phone are often the first to see a scheme in progress. The Alaska opinion lists the signals worth teaching: a new or unfamiliar client from a distant jurisdiction who communicates mainly by email or text, a simple task that produces a fast "payment," and pressure to pay out before that payment clears.4 Add one more from the second scheme: any message, however familiar it looks, that changes where money should go.
If money has already moved
Speed matters. The State Bar of California lists the first steps:5
- Contact your bank immediately.
- Notify law enforcement and file a complaint at IC3.gov.
- Inform the affected client.
- Report the incident to your malpractice carrier.
If you suspect a check is counterfeit before depositing it, don't deposit it; contact your bank.6 Check your own state's rules for any required notice of a trust account overdraft, and keep these steps on one page where the people who handle the account can find it.
Why a policy isn't enough on its own
Picture a hypothetical: it is late on a Friday, a settlement is set to fund Monday, and an email that looks like it came from opposing counsel's assistant says their bank details have changed. A written policy says to call. Whether someone actually picks up the phone depends on whether they have seen that kind of message before, in a setting where getting it wrong cost nothing. We explain why that kind of repetition matters in Why Annual Security Training Doesn't Stick.
For a broader self-check covering account access, payment verification, and reporting, see the Email Fraud Readiness Checklist.
Want your attorneys and staff practicing these checks before a real request arrives? A 20-Minute Readiness Review is a conversation about what that could look like for your firm.
Book a 20-Minute Readiness ReviewSources
- FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 IC3 Annual Report
- North Carolina State Bar, 2020 Formal Ethics Opinion 5: A Lawyer's Responsibility in Avoiding Fraudulent Attempts to Obtain Entrusted Client Funds, adopted January 15, 2021
- North Carolina State Bar, 2015 Formal Ethics Opinion 6: Lawyer's Professional Responsibility When Third Party Steals Funds from Trust Account, adopted October 23, 2015
- Alaska Bar Association, Ethics Opinion No. 2025-2: A Lawyer's Duty to Safeguard Client Trust Funds from Third Party Fraudulent and Criminal Activity, adopted April 23, 2025
- The State Bar of California, Fraud Alert: New and Old Scams Targeting Attorneys
- Illinois State Bar Association, ARDC alert: Email scams and lawyer trust accounts, December 16, 2010
- The Florida Bar News, Scam targets lawyers with fake injury claims and counterfeit checks, July 9, 2025